Showing posts with label Interesting. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Interesting. Show all posts

Monday, October 12, 2009

Top 10 Tough Laws in the World

Ignorance is no defense – especially when it comes to ignorance of the laws in countries you plan to visit. While it may seem natural to study some of the general customs and laws in major foreign countries you might not expect, for example, to have to look for strange law changes in somewhere like Florida. Most places in the world are relatively easy to get along in. Some strange laws are nothing more than folklore. Every once in a while, though, you’re going to run into something a bit off the wall and it’s important for you to be prepared in advance.


10. DON’T FEED THE PIGEONS (ITALY)
In Italy it is illegal to feed the pigeons. Ok, that’s a bit of a blanket statement. The rule actually has the potential to change from city to city. Make sure you leave the pigeons alone while you’re in Venice, though – the locals are tired of cleaning up pigeon poop. You’ll also want to avoid jumping into fountains, walking around without your shirt on (would you DO that as a tourist), and sitting on the sidewalk to eat your lunch. Fines range from a warning to monetary infractions anywhere from $50 to $600.

9. EATING IN PUBLIC (UNITED ARAB EMIRATES)
Before you leave for the United Arab Emirates you’ll want to make sure you aren’t visiting during Ramadan. During that time you are not allowed to eat or drink in public during fasting hours (ie. daylight hours) at all. Think we’re kidding? Tourists have been fined up to $275 for drinking juice in public. Avoid public displays of affection as well unless you want to spend a few months in jail.

8. DON’T PAY IN CHANGE (CANADA)
Ever have the urge to empty your piggy bank of quarters and run down to the corner store? Don’t do it in Canada. The Currency Act of 1985 prohibits consumers from using unreasonable amounts of coins to pay for purchases. This means you can’t pay for an item in all coins (especially if it’s over $10). Even the use of dollar-coins is limited. The shop owner has the right to choose whether or not he wants to take your coins but doesn’t have to.
7. WASH YOUR CAR (MOSCOW)
In the beautiful city of Moscow it is illegal to drive a dirty car. The definition of dirty, however, is up in the air. Is a dirty car one on which you can draw pictures in the dust? Does it hide the license plate? Does it make the driver invisible? We suppose you’ll find out if the police poll you over but the fines tend to be whatever the police decide to charge you – unless, of course, you offer him a bit of cash.
6. LEAVE YOUR HEADLIGHTS ON (DENMARK)
Studies in Denmark have shown that vehicles with their headlights on are more noticeable by other drivers than those who have their headlights off. You’d think this law would apply to night driving but it doesn’t. Drivers here are required to leave their headlights on during the day as well or may face a fine of up to $100.

5. DON’T STOP ON THE AUTOBAHN (GERMANY)
You’ve heard of the Autobahn, right? The notorious German road where there are no speed limits? Make sure you fill your gas tank BEFORE you get on this daunting road. It’s illegal to pull over on the side of this road for any reason and, if you do, it’s illegal to get out and walk. You are, after all, endangering the lives of the people who are still driving at warp speeds.

4. PUT YOUR SHIRT ON (THAILAND)
In Thailand it is illegal to drive a car or motorcycle without a shirt on – regardless of how hot it is that day. Punishments range from verbal warnings to tickets costing about $10. This is no joke – the local police will pull you over.

3. DON’T KISS YOUR LOVER GOODBYE (FRANCE AND ENGLAND)
Love died a little bit on April 5th of 1910. Lovers spend so much time kissing each other goodbye at train stations that trains were actually running late. The law is relatively old, though, and really isn’t enforced today – in France, that is. In Warrington Bank Quay in England, however, you’ll be asked to move your goodbyes to the “kissing zone.”
2. WEAR A COVER UP (GRENADA)
The folks at Grenada really do have a point. Cruisers visiting the beaches for day excursions have taken to strolling city streets in nothing but their bathing suits. In order to reign in a sense of decency, the city has instituted a fine for those who aren’t wearing decent clothing off of the beaches. Fines can reach up to $270 but the local tourist boards would like you to believe that the law is not enforced. Perhaps its best to simply cover up rather than trying to find out for yourself.

1. NO GUM CHEWING (SINGAPORE)
Those with gum chewing habits may want to call it quits before heading to Singapore. The government really wants to keep the city clean and will fine you for chewing gum, feeding the birds (it causes poop) and forgetting to flush a public toilet. The only legal gum you can chew is Nicorette but you have to get it from a doctor and they will give your name to government officials to confirm you’re allowed to have a wad in your mouth. These aren’t the only strange laws around the world but they’re certainly worth noting. Make sure you do your research before leaving on your next trip. Better safe than sorry!

Monday, March 17, 2008

The Reaping

Movie type: Horror, Suspense/Thriller
MPAA rating: R:for violence, disturbing images and some sexuality
Year of release: 2007
Run time: 96 minutes
Directed by: Stephen Hopkins
Cast: Annasophia Robb, David Morrissey, Hilary Swank, Idris Elba, Manolo Cardona, Stephen Rea

In "The Reaping," Hilary Swank endures the 10 biblical plagues and takes on a backwoods Satanic cult. Having faced killer homophobes in "Boys Don't Cry" and deadly bedsores in "Million Dollar Baby," the two-time Oscar winner would seem perfect for the job of snuffing out evil.

But this long-delayed, pitiful excuse for a horror film feels like penance for her great success. She's all wrong for this sort of effects-drenched disaster picture, anyway. To get a sense of the incongruity, imagine Sally Field in her prime carrying, say, 1985's "Howling II."

"The Reaping" does have a kernel of campy promise. Swank plays professor Katherine Winter , an ex-missionary minister who, after losing her entire family in some Sudanese blood rite, trots the globe using science to debunk supposed miracles. She's a merciless, atheistic Lara Croft, kicking the poor and the hopeless while they're down. But since this is the rare horror film about the power of belief, we quickly know she'll have the bejesus scared back into her by the time it's over.

After overturning her 48th purported miracle in Chile, Katherine returns home to Louisiana State University, where she's greeted by David. He plays a schoolteacher who provides Katherine with her biggest case yet.

A river in his little bayou town, hilariously called Haven , flows with blood, and the townsfolk have placed the blame on a blond girl (AnnaSophia Robb ) who was found nearby with her dead brother. They think she murdered him.

The schoolteacher tells Katherine that the town is convinced this is the start of the plagues. Sure enough, when she arrives with her co-worker Ben (Idris Elba ), a practicing, religiously tattooed Christian, the countdown begins: a hail of frogs, a swarm of locusts, diseased livestock, nasty boils on the skin, etc.

In Exodus , the plagues were calamities that God wrought on the Egyptians for enslaving the Israelites . But Katherine is unmoved, offering a perfectly natural rationalization for it all. Such explanations require Swank to speak in paragraphs that illuminate her literacy but not her talent. Well this paragraph is where she basically relates the plagues in the past with scientific arguments. Quite phenomenal those but then the crowd watching the movie in Madras, India, is so retarded that they just can't have the patience to see the long dialogues. The idiots clap but I would have frowned in my usual senses but then their appreciation was sort of more timing centric. She needed that clap for an amazing dialogue delivery !

She may rely on facts, but Katherine's unconscious has a mind of its own. She has nightmares of the Sudan and sex fantasies about the schoolteacher. She also has to figure out why her old priest friend (Stephen Rea , looking suitably embarrassed) keeps insisting she's in danger.

The screenplay never credibly explains what's going on. Not after one viewing -- and that was enough for me, thank you. None of what we discover is ever interesting enough to make us care . The story vaguely cribs from "The Wicker Man ," "Rosemary's Baby ," "The Exorcist ," and "The Omen ," but doesn't come close to the lasting fright of any of those titles. And why drag Louisiana or Sudan into any of this, only to portray the people who live there as insultingly backward ?

Stephen Hopkins directs "The Reaping" according to the Satanic horror manual, right down to the choral chanting on the soundtrack. The lighting is often too dark to see what's happening, and the editing makes a mess of even the most tolerable scenes (the locust attack, for example). Like most of these movies, the film is cut like a trailer for a horror flick instead of being a horror flick proper. And the staging of the final sequence is laughable. Surrounded by explosions, and computer effects worthy of any Atari game, the actors appear to be standing around while a wind fan blows and wondering how they would look like in the big screen. I was kinda vexed as the movie was drawing to a closure.

Swank, of course, is a trouper, playing a part meant for an actor with a quarter of her fame and half her Oscars. But would Sarah Michelle Gellar even have dared?


Saturday, October 13, 2007

Excerpt from the Interview - Games Indians Play: Why We Are the Way We Are

In his book Games Indians Play: Why We Are the Way We Are, V. Raghunathan writes about a farmer whose corn won top awards year after year. When a reporter asked about the secret of his success, the farmer attributed it to the fact that he shared his corn with his neighbors. Why, the reporter wondered, would the farmer want to share his seed when those neighbors also competed with him for the prize? The farmer's reply was, "The wind picks up pollen from the ripening corn and swirls it from field to field. If my neighbors grew inferior corn, cross-pollination would steadily degrade the quality of my corn. If I am to grow good corn, I must help my neighbors do the same."

That Indians often fail to act like this farmer is the principal theme of Raghunathan's book. Using examples as varied as their tendency to drive through red lights to their failure to protect the environment, Raghunathan argues that Indians often act in ways that focus on winning immediate gains at the expense of long-term benefits. What makes Raghunathan's approach unusual is that his argument isn't a moral diatribe: He employs game theory -- a branch of mathematics -- and related concepts, such as the prisoner's dilemma, to present his case.

A former professor at the Indian Institute of Management in Ahmedabad, Raghunathan in 2001 was named president of the ING Vysya Bank. He now works for the GMR Group as managing director of GMR Industries, the group's agri-business division, and CEO of the GMR Varalakshmi Foundation. Raghunathan also teaches game theory and behavioral economics at the University of Bocconi in Italy. To relax, he repairs mechanical clocks.

India Knowledge@Wharton: Your book is titled, Games Indians Play: Why We Are the Way We Are. What are Indians like?

Raghunathan: In the first chapter of my book, I describe what I believe Indians are like by offering 12 canons of "Indian-ness." For example, one of our traits is "low trustworthiness." By that I mean we are most likely not to cooperate in a prisoner's dilemma kind of situation. Privately, Indians are reasonably smart -- in fact, we are as smart as anybody else -- but publicly we are dumb. Our ability to understand the need for cooperation is very low. We believe that cooperation and selfishness cannot go together -- which is not true. We also tend to be very fatalistic in our outlook. We give excuses such as, "What can I do alone? Everybody else is looking out for himself, so why shouldn't I?"

India Knowledge@Wharton: What exactly is the prisoner's dilemma, which you just mentioned? How do you use it to explain the behavior of Indian business people?

Raghunathan: The prisoner's dilemma, which was first developed by researchers at the Rand Corporation during the 1950s, is a concept that has come to occupy a prominent place in game theory. The problem statement goes like this: Assume that you and I are co-conspirators in a crime. Each of us is selfish and coldly rational. We are being interrogated in two separate cells, and we are unable to communicate with each other. The interrogator tells you that he has enough evidence to put each of us away in the slammer for two years each. However, if you squeal on me and help him prosecute me, he will set you free immediately and imprison me for five years. He also tells you that he will make an identical offer to me (though you and I cannot communicate). If each of us betrays the other, he will put us both away for four years. Being selfish and rational, we have to respond to the offer in terms of what is in our best self-interest.

Now, here is our dilemma: Should we defect and squeal against each other, or should we cooperate and hold out against the interrogator? You may reason that if I defect, it would be in your interest to defect as well -- otherwise you will be stuck in prison for five years while I go free. And if I do not defect, it is still in your interest to defect, since you will walk free immediately. So you decide to defect. I follow the same reasoning, and I defect as well. As a result, each of us ends up with four years in prison. If we were to cooperate, though, each of us would be better off because the interrogator has evidence to put each of us away for just two years. But for us to end up with that outcome, we need to recognize that the two-year punishment we will have to accept for cooperating is better for each of us than the four-year punishment we would get for defecting and ratting out each other.

Our situation is such that we believe that if we do not cooperate, we benefit more. We put ourselves in the other person's situation: We ask, if he does not cooperate, why should I? If he cooperates, it may still be in my interest not to cooperate, because I benefit by not cooperating.

Although this may sound abstract and theoretical, this is often how Indian business people tend to think. Very often our exporters show samples that are of a high quality, but when the time comes to ship the goods, they send something inferior. This is very much like a prisoner's dilemma situation. You may initially make money because you have gotten something for nothing, but going forward -- in an iterative kind of a context -- you will most probably fail. You will stop getting export orders when your customers figure out that they cannot depend on your quality. They will stop trusting you and start suspecting you. In my book, I cite the example of some Indian companies that had won orders to export powdered red peppers (or chillies) to Korea. Apparently, when the goods arrived, the Koreans discovered that the very first consignment was adulterated with red brick powder. The Koreans emptied the whole consignment in the high seas, vowing never to import this product from India. I read a similar report as recently as last year.

The prisoner's dilemma also explains why Indian companies often fail in joint ventures. We tend to be over-argumentative and often look out for our own narrow advantage rather than trying to make the venture succeed. If you look at the way we behave in all kinds of situations -- whether it involves jumping a red light or dumping our garbage in the streets -- that kind of behavior can be explained by the prisoner's dilemma. I will keep my own house clean, but the streets are not my business. Since everybody thinks the same way, the public interest suffers.

India Knowledge@Wharton: Is that what you meant when you said that Indians are "privately smart and publicly dumb?" Why is that so, and what are the consequences of this behavior?

Raghunathan: Another way of expressing this idea is that we are good lightning chess players but terrible long-term chess players. If I have to see two moves ahead, I may do just fine, but if I have to see 10 moves ahead, I may not. Public interest is like seeing 10 moves ahead, while seeking out private advantage is like seeing two moves ahead. In the prisoner's dilemma, it is clear that in the short run, it pays you to defect. It takes you a longer period of reflection to realize that even given your selfish motive, you are likely to benefit more if you cooperate -- and if each player does the same thing, both come out winners. I came to this conclusion through many other concepts of game theory that I have written about in the book. Having seen how people think in other countries and in India, I [realized] that Indians would tend to conclude in a jiffy that it is in their interest to defect and squeal against their partner. It takes longer to think through that if the partner also defects, both would be worse off. Unfortunately, Indians often don't think that far. That is why I say we are privately smart but publicly dumb.

India Knowledge@Wharton: In taking the long-term view, what is the "tit-for-tat" strategy, and how does that apply to business situations?

Raghunathan: We tend to deal with the same people over and over again, even though we may interact with hundreds or thousands of parties over our lifetimes. If I tell myself that I will never be the first person to defect, but after that, I will do whatever the other person does, that is the "tit-for-tat" strategy.

In my book, I cite examples from the experiments that the mathematician Robert Axelrod conducted on this concept. Life is a series of interactions of the PD (prisoner's dilemma) kind, and you deal with the same people several times. I may cooperate with you in an interaction, and you may cooperate as well. Then I go off and interact with other people, and then come back again to you. Remembering that you had cooperated in the past, I cooperate again. Essentially, I keep cooperating in every interaction until you defect. In the following interaction, I too defect, remembering our last interaction. Now it is up to you to decide whether to cooperate or not. If you cooperate, I go back to cooperating as well.

This strategy is different than that of a so-called "massive retaliator," whose response to one act of defection is to never, ever cooperate again. The tit-for-tat strategy does not have a long memory. It is forgiving. It is a good strategy in the sense that it is never the first one to defect, but at the same time it retaliates against defectors. It makes it clear that it will not respond to defection with continued cooperation. It responds to defection with defection, and will not resume cooperation unless the other party cooperates first.

I show in the book that the tit-for-tat strategy never wins against any one individual. But in the long run, people get to know that you are a gentleman; you are never the first to defect. They know that you are forgiving, but also that they cannot take you for granted. All these are, broadly, the hallmarks of a gentleman, and so I call this the "gentleman's strategy."

This strategy can easily be applied to a large number of business situations. For example, consider a businessman who normally supplies materials of high quality but once in a while -- one out of 10 times -- he supplies sub-standard materials. In other words, he defects one time out of 10, and cooperates nine times out of 10, hoping that you will not retaliate. He is trying to gain some extra points over his interactions. Such a businessman is not using the tit-for-tat strategy; he is using a random-defect strategy. What happens with this strategy is that if one of the players he runs into is a massive retaliator, that player will stop dealing with him completely. His ability to collect any further revenues from that party will end.

However, a tit-for-tat strategist will never defect first. As a result, it becomes clear to all the players over the long run that the tit-for-tat player will never retaliate unless they did something wrong to him first. Unfortunately, in India such business people are few and far between.

India Knowledge@Wharton: In one chapter you cite the example of the TVS Group, a company in Southern India, which recognized that foregoing short-term benefits sometimes helps you gain long-term advantages.

Raghunathan: Yes -- Suresh Krishna, chairman of Sundaram Fasteners, which is part of the TVS Group, told me this story about his father, T.S. Krishna. His father had told him this anecdote during the 1960s but he still remembers it.

The TVS Group, like other traders in Southern India, imported diesel engines during the 1940s. The engines were imported from London for about Rs. 1,100 ($220 at the prevailing exchange rate) and were sold in the local market at a 25% to 30% markup for about Rs. 1,400 ($280). But during the mid-1940s, supply was disrupted because of World War II, and this led to an extreme shortage of engines. Anyone who had an import license could easily sell the engines for Rs. 5,000 ($1,000) -- many customers were willing to pay such prices. At one level, you could call this market pricing since the demand-supply situation was so skewed. It was a seller's market. But, at another level, you could also view this as a defection of sorts because the sellers were exploiting the wartime shortage to force buyers to pay a higher price.

Krishna decided that the TVS Group would not follow that approach. Despite the shortage and the prevailing high prices, he insisted on charging the normal markup of 25% and kept selling engines for Rs. 1,400 throughout the war. At that time, the local business community thought he was either naïve or downright daft for missing out on the opportunity to make as much money as possible. When the war ended, however, the traders who had profiteered from the shortage went out of business one after another; today no one remembers those companies. But the TVS Group survived, and it continues to be recognized as a valuable company.

In today's terms, we might say that TVS had better corporate governance, and its strategy paid off because it delivered long-term shareholder value. Back in 1945, though, it was just one decent man trying to do the right thing for his customers. Krishna refused to defect just because the timing was against his customers. The consequence is that even today, TVS is regarded as a name to be trusted. If the company lists its shares for sale, people subscribe to them. If products carry the TVS brand, people buy them. Krishna probably did not stop to think about the "brand value" of his behavior; still, his actions helped build the TVS brand.

India Knowledge@Wharton: Why do you think Indians are bad at regulation and self-regulation?

Raghunathan: I think self-regulation is molded by regulation. Even in the U.S., when you are driving along a highway, if you did not know that a police patrol car might unexpectedly appear behind you with lights flashing, you might be tempted to drive faster than the speed limit. If the U.S. government had not come down hard on emissions, maybe the auto industry would have not revised its production standards. I believe that self regulation is indeed affected by regulation.

In India, part of our problem is that the regulatory environment is weak. Combined with our fundamental lack of self regulation, matters tend to spin out of control very soon. As I said above, we are like lightning chess players and a little too quick to see where our immediate self-interest lies. When we think we can get away with something and the probability of getting caught is low, we tend to do whatever we want to do.

For example, consider the Companies Act, which governs disclosure of financial information by publicly listed firms. Today, if a public company does not disclose its financial statements on time, the penalty is Rs. 1,000 ($25) a day. This implies that if a company is willing to spend $9,125 on fines, it can go a whole year without making financial information available in the public domain. To me, that almost sounds like an incentive for companies not to file their annual financial statements. How can we have self-regulation when the regulations themselves are so weak? The reality is that back when these regulations were formulated, a thousand bucks a day was a lot of money. Today, you would need to charge corporations a penalty of Rs. 10 million ($250,000) a day for it to be a deterrent.

The trouble in India is that the chances or being caught are low, and the consequences of being caught are weak. As a result, we have forgotten what self regulation means. Democracy has been misinterpreted to mean the right to do whatever you want.

India Knowledge@Wharton: Why is it so hard for Indians to work in teams? Even in a team sport like cricket, one-upmanship often undermines collective performance. Does game theory offer any explanations?

Raghunathan: That is a good question, but I don't know to what extent game theory can answer it. The only thing I would say is that it depends on how the team players resolve their own prisoner's dilemma-type situations.

If you approach the resolution of the dilemma externally, you will never resolve the issue. By approaching it externally, I mean asking yourself, 'If the other party defects, what should I do?' or 'If the other party does not defect, what should I do?' If you ask yourself such questions, the answer at which you will arrive is that you should defect. If both parties ask themselves the same questions, they both end up defecting -- and losing.

The only correct way to resolve the prisoner's dilemma is to ask yourself, 'What is the correct thing, deep down, for me to do?' In other words, what is the action that if everyone were to follow it, would lead to the collective good? If you were to approach the prisoner's dilemma that way, both accomplices would arrive at the same answer -- not to squeal against the other. You need to approach the issue internally. The problem arises when you expect others to defect, so you try and pre-empt the harmful consequences by defecting yourself.

India Knowledge@Wharton: To what extent are such tendencies uniquely Indian? For example, if you have been following the horror stories about the recall of millions of toys manufactured in China, wouldn't you think these are human traits rather than Indian ones?

Raghunathan: Absolutely. I agree completely that these are human traits. You will find them everywhere in the world. The theories I discuss in my book were not developed in India but outside, and people have been writing about and talking about them long before my book came along. But one major difference is that in other parts of the world, the tendency to defect is much lower when you play the prisoner's dilemma type of games. In India, the tendency to defect is much higher.

Consider the example about the toys being recalled in China. It is of course true that in this one dimension Chinese manufacturers -- or their subcontractors -- did not pay attention to quality. But I can think of 10 other dimensions in which the Chinese have chosen cooperation with one another over defection. For example, Chinese people show enormous discipline when they work in a team. I have seen Chinese cab drivers stopping before a red light at 2:00 a.m. -- no Indian taxi driver would ever do that. The number of medals they win during the Olympics shows that they have systems that work very well.

In Shanghai, in four years they built out the magnetic levitation train that connects the airport to the city. Or consider a simpler example. When I was in Shanghai, I saw a newspaper ad that addressed the citizens and said, "If you want to be residents of a world-class city, you must behave accordingly and not hang your laundry out to dry on your balcony." When I drove around the city, I did not see a single Chinese home with washed clothes hanging on the balcony. In India, it is unthinkable that you could even make such an appeal.

So it is true that nowhere in the world are people immune to the prisoner's dilemma. But the incidence of defection in almost every walk of life seems to be unique to India. This may seem to be a caricature, but if I am exaggerating certain features, it is because I want to draw attention to them.

India Knowledge@Wharton: Do you have any reason to hope that the way Indians are will some day become the way Indians were?

Raghunathan: I am not a spiritual person. But in doing research for this book, for the first time I read the Bhagavad-Gita [the Sanskrit text that is regarded as sacred by Hindus]. I realized that the Gita has a lot of things which help resolve the prisoner's dilemma readily. For example, if you do your dharma [duty] towards humanity, the level of cooperation could be much higher. That is what having a good character is all about.

This gives me hope for the future. As India's economy improves and education spreads, I hope defection will be replaced by cooperation. My question about why Indians are the way they are is a rhetorical one -- it is an expression of my frustration. But my attitude towards India is like that of a parent towards a beloved child who needs correction. You don't love that child any less; it is because of your love that you want to bring about change. I hope these ideas will encourage some introspection about how to make things better.

Can also be found "here" .

Friday, October 12, 2007

And the consequence ....

You know life is funny. What goes around comes back and takes a big lump of something from you. No no not about anything bad. It was all because of the previous note which was impervious to a few. The intent was not to showcase anything bad but to have something akin to a shoutbox where you just lend your voice and just feel good that you flushed your system with regards to that topic. That day that time to me it was the Extra Marital affair sequence.

So then I go out to my usual French class (YEA!) and on my way back I get to a coffee joint and have a quick sip of my usual coffee and a quick bite. As I was munching along and lazing around reading an interesting book "Games Indians Play: Why We Are the Way We Are " (review of which would be out in a day's time), I suddenly heard two girls, with their usual accent of Ya and I know thing, came along and one of them said "I read about an article a jerk wrote. It was about EMA and some bull crap". I figured vaguely if they were talking about me. Damn! don't ask me why. The guilt that I wrote something is one thing and the interest to hear them talk with those gesticulations was another. But for the time being I knew it was either me or someone who committed a serious offense. The other one voiced over "Oh yea". The first one goes, lemme show you that piece of crap. I was not quite edgy and that lady quickly rammed something in the puter and since it was a joint to laze around, I thought it was going to be trivial and took it easy with the book.

Guess who the "jerk" is. Viola ! you get nothing for guessing right. It was yours truly and I thought the template of the blog was such a common thing that no one would have recognized. But I was damned. They were actually getting to my blog and were roasting me alive. I was sitting near by and I almost spit everything I had in my mouth when I saw that "Hippie" picture on the right. I was dead sure it was me. All I managed to do was to ask for the check and slipped out of the joint in a jiffy. Along the way I thought there could be something wrong in what I said or wrote. But should'nt I be, like, having that wee bit of freedom to offload what I think. :-(

Anyway, the damage is done and I realized one thing. I will continue to write what I write regardless of what they say. But interesting they called me a "Jerk" :-)

Tuesday, October 09, 2007

EBay and You Tube - For anything and anyone !!

There are two incidents that I really wanted to write about when I think about E-Bay and You Tube. They are the typical internet storm creators when it comes to ruling their own mass. There has been no other bidding site that could match the muzzle strength of Ebay and more so we know what You Tube is capable of in it's own way.

First the scanner on EBay, I read an article in BBC on how an unusual item was up for sale: "For sale: Belgium, a kingdom in three parts ... free premium: the king and his court (costs not included)."

Reason for the odd ad being posted by one disgruntled Belgian was because he wanted to protest at his country's political crisis, which reached a 100-day landmark Tuesday with no end in sight to the squabbling between Flemish and Walloon politicians. BTW, if you did not know Belgium wants to be divided as separate land for the Flemish government and Walloon government. And the Walloon's are constitute the French speaking part of Belgium whilst the Flemish the Dutch speaking group.

Gerrit Six, the teacher and former journalist placed the advertisement Saturday, offering free delivery, but pointing out that the country was coming secondhand and that potential buyers would have to take on over $300 billion in national debt.

Six claims that he decided to vent his frustration through the Internet ad and for his act Six' idea got a mixed reaction on the streets of Brussels.

EBay was happy to take Six's advertisement !! However, the company decided to pull the ad Tuesday after receiving a bid of $14 million. This just summed up that "anything and everything" in this universe is salable and there are always some buyers who can manage to do greater than life stunts. I still cannot believe how a website agreed to throw up an ad to sell a country ** Chuckle **

Likewise the other incident is a rather unfortunate one as for as the celebrity cricket player Ricky Ponting is concerned. It was not long ago that he led the team of the invincibles to the land of Kama Sutra - India. And what he had faced was something that he never would have imagined. Being "force" kissed by a straight faced sober Indian and if he thought no one would ever know, he forgot about You Tube ! And this just sums up that "Anything and Everything" can be found in You Tube.

The next day there was this video posted and there goes the pride of the lion. Wonder how I would ever react to some petty incident for that moment to suddenly become a source for being a butt of ridicule to many others. If I was the opposition captain, I would be really tempted to have a go at him and see how he reacts. Interesting world this is !